"Anatomy of a Disaster, What We Learned from Katrina "

Dr. Lewis E. Link, Senior Research Engineer, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Maryland, and Director, Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force

Summary by Kathryn Woodruff , MEM 2007

Dr. Lewis E. Link, Senior Research Engineer at University of Maryland, presented an interesting defense to the claim that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers are to blame for part of the disaster inflicted by Hurricane Katrina. Rather modest and well-spoken in his presentation, Dr. Link outlined a simplified10-step process that the Corps must go through before a project is completed. Each step offered further bureaucratic decision-making and cost-sharing set-backs. Dr. Link also offered insight into what members of the Corps are actively effecting in light of the disaster, specifically a risk analysis Task Force report to be finalized in November. It soon became evident that critics of the Katrina disaster can no longer just finger-point the blame at poor design and inadequate Army Corps service.

In an accessible talk to students of all backgrounds, Dr. Link first described the physical barriers to development in New Orleans, specifically topographic vulnerability. He then briefly explained the Corps design. Emergency response and flood control are two of the objectives the Corps has permission to work on with Congressional oversight. The Corps’ project in New Orleans, under flood control and emergency response objectives, first had to undergo initial project identification. The next steps are:

• Congressional study resolution and authorization, authorized by the Water Resources Development ActReconnaissance study funded by Corps’ accountConduct feasibility study with cost sharing 50/50 with a non-federal entityAdministrative review involving the OMB and the Pentagon, adding to complexity.Project Authorization by Congressional bill. Hurricane authorization for New Orleans was originally passed in 1965. Congress set the storm parameters for the Corps that were only raised once in 1986, but not enough for Hurricane Katrina’s force.Executive PED agreement sets design parameters, preventing project adaptation. Costs shared 75/25 between federal and non-federal funds, complicating parameter agreements.Engineering and design with construction cost sharing 65/35 between federal and local funds. This is where further compromises occur as local entities not involved in previous design decisions have an incentive to lower the costs of construction. In the case of New Orleans surge gates and adequate materials were cut from the plan due to costs.Congress appropriates construction funds. For New Orleans, the plan was in process for 40 years and is still not complete.
• Project Construction with years of piecemeal funding.

While the objectives of the Corps are positive, the procedural requirements involving several layers of federal and local involvement and cost sharing slows projects, prevents change and adaptation even when technology and scientific understanding increases, and promotes cost cutting and complacency in maintenance beyond which the Corps has direct control.  Rather than acting defeatist with the results from Katrina, though, Dr. Link and other Corps members put together a Task Force (IPET) with Corps funds and were able to incorporate current risk analysis and storm modeling data along with the lessons learned from the New Orleans levee and flood wall designs. The report was updated in real-time so as to directly contribute to reconstruction efforts post-Katrina. This allowed for improved structures to go up immediately. With more accurate and incorporated modeling, better coordination between stakeholders, incentives against cost-cutting and a better feedback loop integrated with the design process, the Corps is well prepared to build better prepared flood control and emergency response projects. However, such lessons also need to be acknowledged by Congress and local entities in order to be effective.