Scott Borgerson began his lecture by summarizing the recent changes in the Arctic Ocean, particularly the rapid retreat of summer sea ice. In terms of international relations, however, it is the thickness of the ice, rather than its absolute extent, that is of most importance. In the last six years the average thickness of summer sea ice has halved. Scientists are not completely sure why the Arctic is melting so fast, although important factors seem to be changing atmospheric patterns, warm water masses moving toward the pole through the Bering Strait, and the albedo feedback effect.

Worryingly, models of arctic sea-ice retreat seem to be underestimating the rate of change, reflecting the fact that it is almost impossible to accurately model the near-infinite complexity of earth systems. In 2006 models projected that summer sea ice might disappear by mid-century. Then September sea ice fell to a record low far below expectations in the summer of 2007. Simply extrapolating the current trend suggests that the Arctic Ocean will be ice-free in the summer by 2013.

This rapid melt opens up a huge number of geopolitical issues in the Arctic, particularly over mineral resources and shipping routes. The Arctic is extremely rich in minerals: the USGS estimated in a recently-published study that 22 percent of undiscovered but technically-recoverable oil reserves are in the Arctic. Including these, Russia has double the oil reserves of Saudi Arabia. Other minerals also abound in the Arctic – the largest nickel mine in the world is in Russia and the largest zinc mine is in Alaska.

Possibly the most interesting foreign relations issue in the Arctic is that of the new arctic sea routes. Sea routes have been key to global power shifts in the past. For example, the discovery of new sea routes around the Cape of Good Hope and Cape Horn in the 15th and 16th centuries opened up new resources and markets that were the foundation for first the Portuguese and then the British empires. More recently the construction of the Suez and Panama canals had massive geo-strategic implications.

The opening of two commercial arctic sea routes, the Northwest Passage along the Canadian coast and the Northern Sea Route north of Russia, is now a question of ‘when’, not ‘if’. The Northern Sea Route was first fully opened in 2005, in 2007 the Northwest Passage was opened, and in the summer of 2008 both routes were open for the first time in recorded history. A future, ice-free Arctic may even result in a new Trans-Polar Route across the North Pole outside the territorial waters of any nation. New technologies such as container ships that can also operate as an icebreaker promise to further accelerate the increasing geo-significance of the Arctic.

Currently the geopolitics of the Arctic are something of a mess. Almost every national border in the Arctic is disputed and these conflicts are becoming increasingly important as the region and its valuable resources become more accessible because of sea ice melt. For example, Hans Island is little more than a rock west of Greenland, but is hotly disputed between Canada and Denmark because of the large amounts of oil thought to be in the area. Similarly a dispute over the extension of the U.S. – Canadian border into the continental shelf revolves mainly around the oil reserves at stake. Another important issue is that of the status of the Northwest Passage. The Canadian government views this as Canadian territorial waters and believes that any other definition would threaten the territorial integrity of Canada. The U.S., however, holds that they are an international straight and that maintaining their status as such is critical to the free movement of naval vessels, which is at the heart of U.S. naval strategy.

In addition, Arctic nations are currently eligible to claim large amounts of additional territory under Article 76 of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This is what prompted the Russian submarine expedition to plant a flag at the North Pole in 2007, claiming a large swathe of the Arctic Ocean as Russian territory. The U.S. is yet to ratify UNCLOS even though as it is eligible to claim territory under the Chukchi Cap where geological surveys indicate that there is a large amount of oil available. This has been to its detriment because lack of ratification prevents the U.S. from having a seat at the table to vet other countries’ claims, or to engage in environmental or safety regulation of Arctic shipping.

Mr. Borgerson ended by emphasizing the lack of a current or coherent U.S. policy on the Arctic, despite the fact that it has over 33,000 miles of Arctic coastline. Problems include a fledgling, geriatric icebreaker fleet with no plans to build it up, a current Arctic policy that does not mention global warming, the refusal to ratify UNCLOS and the lack of a functioning agreement with Canada over the status of the Northwest Passage. Mr. Borgerson warned that the future of the Arctic could depend on the U.S. taking leadership on multilateral issues, including global warming and arctic governance. Such engagement could transform an ‘Arctic Race’ of no-holds-barred, environmentally-damaging race for resources, into an ‘Arctic Saga’ of controlled and sustainable economic growth.