The Architecture of Expansion NATO has debated whether to extend membership to Eastern Europe. Expansion alienates Russia and prolongs the life of an obsolete alliance. Christel Fonzo-Eberhard |
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), formed during the Cold War to contain a Soviet Communist threat, is in a quandary. NATO was designed to provide mutual defense to any of its members, collectively or individually, in the case of a military attack. The members consisted of the United States, Canada, and the Allied powers of Europe. While the need for NATO was obvious during the height of the Cold War, the existence of this military alliance is questionable during peacetime. NATO is only as strong as the perception of a common interest in deterring a common menace. |
With Communism unraveling since 1989, and the fall of the Berlin Wall leading to the unification of Germany, how could any sagacious leader admit to a potential threat? With a changing format in global politics, NATO is having to rethink and reconstruct its role.
The following questions reflect part of the ongoing debate: 1) Should an organization formed in order to protect against Soviet-led Communism continue its existence? 2) Is admission of the former nemesis Russia, into the Alliance consistent with NATOs credo? 3) Why enlarge the Alliance if no large military threat exists in the North Atlantic area? 4) If NATO finds itself reevaluating its raison dêtre, then should the new product have a new name, therefor representing a new organization? 5) Will the residue of old Cold War tensions affect an enlarged NATO?
The Case for Expansion
According to Gebhardt von Moltke, NATOs Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, the overall reconstruction of an enlarged NATO will take place in an open, transparent, and gradual environment helping further European stability.
Von Moltke argues that the Alliance cannot detach itself from the desires of prospective members, who are often eager to embrace and secure democratic values. In accordance with this notion, the Alliance has decided to consider new membership, thereby enlarging its scope and role. A few of the roles that the Alliance endorses and seeks to fulfill consists in aiding the development of political relations, improving economic conditions, and strengthening democratic institutions. The principles for the expansion of NATO, according to von Moltke, include a cooperative effort for open, democratic countries, regard for human rights, and proliferation of free market economies.
| The main idea behind expansion is to create a cooperative process through integration not based on the consideration or exclusion of any specific threat. According to Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, "allies can, by unanimous agreement, invite European states, in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the serious | The principles for the expansion of NATO include a cooperative effort for open, democratic countries, regard for human rights, and proliferation of free market economies. |
North Atlantic area, to accede to the Treaty."1 Von Moltke asserts that NATO is now, and will always be, a strictly defensive coalition designed to protect its members security interests. The ability of any future member to carry out responsibilities and their ability to conform and adjust to new policies will be a consideration for NATOs Foreign Ministers. |
Under this scrutiny by the Foreign Ministers, countries vying for inclusion are motivated in attracting the attention of NATO executives as seen by their attempt at securing an open democracy within their own states. Enlarging the Alliance in the broader context of a European security construct, pushes the ideology of divisive European lines into extinction.
The Question of Russian Membership
A critical question is NATOs relationship with Russia and Russias petition for membership. In denying Russia admission, the Alliance would ostracize a powerful military country which would disrupt the concept of a united and secure European defense system. In addition, by not admitting the former Communist state, Russian sentiment could perceive exclusion as a military threat and believe that containment still exists in one form or another. The strength of presidential candidate and Communist, General Gennady Zyuganov offers good reason not to include Russia in the possibility of NATO expansion. Should Zyuganov assume power in the upcoming election, it is likely that post-Perestroika Russia will be left out in the cold from NATO inclusion. Essential elements of cohesion and consensus are necessary in order for the proposed direction of enlargement to succeed. If Zyuganov were elected to power, the necessary elements of cohesion would disappear from a perceived safe and secure Europe.
As Europe becomes more integrated and the decline of large scale military threats become less viable, the need for the Alliance to be able to respond and diffuse local hot wars is imperative.
By December of 1996, the Foreign Ministers will convene and decide the fate of the Alliance. It is feasible that a perceived Cold War relic will gain a new international character in a new world order, but at what cost and to whom?
The Case for Exclusion
The exclusionary argument simply asks whether there is a need for an enlarged NATO. This need is basically an issue of American security policy. Does the United States need to protect the interests of a non-convalescent European state and does supporting NATO expansion serve American interests, and can the United States finance these interests?
In April 1995, the American government, strapped by budgetary constraints, substantially reduced a customary payment for NATO infrastructure from $229 million originally requested to $86 million.2 Rhetoric, so prevalent in American politics, advocates the propagation of freedom and democracy abroad without necessarily footing the bill. It is in this manifestation of political rhetoric that the issue of NATO expansion, along with many other foreign policy issues, gridlock in Washington.
Another contra argument proposes that mass immigration from the East to the West, due to political, social, religious, and economic hardships, could threaten stability in Western Europe. Expansion to Eastern and Central Europe would, in a sense, enlarge the boundaries of Western Europe. So the issue becomes one of periphery, there can be no lasting security at the center without security at the periphery. How far must NATO expand to protect and serve everyone under its nuclear umbrella? Will eastward expansion deter conflicts in, for example, the Ukraine or North Africa, as these could be assessed as hot issue areas threatening the stability of NATO members. Conflicts in these areas outside the periphery might seep into the Alliances territory, and it would see itself protecting against conflicts that did not originate from within.
NATO does not need to enlarge itself. Its purpose has been served. The discourse surrounding NATO expansion promotes the specter of a common enemy. |
The western stance on membership expansion to Eastern and Central European nations causes Russia to view this maneuver as one of continued hostility, thereby creating tension between stilled U.S.-Russian relations. In order to appease both Russian sentiments and Eastern and Central European countries desire for inclusion, an alternative approach was attempted with President Clintons initiative proposed January 1994 at a NATO summit with the Partnership for Peace. This alternative offers joint maneuvers and mutual cooperation, but not full membership within NATO, "The Partnership for Peace will expand and intensify political and military cooperation throughout Europe."3 Long term objectives involve the development of partner cooperation and successful execution alongside NATO initiatives in such fields as peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts. Successful implementation of PFP will depend entirely on a secure internal framework and adequate funding, which will depend on the resources of the partners. To date 26 nations have joined the Partnership including all former Warsaw Pact nations except Tajikistan.
Partnership for Peace is a bitter pill to swallow, but it will not cure the symptom at hand, which is to appease NATO aspirants. If NATO expands, what would its limits of expansion be? Including Russia in NATO expansion would undermine the premise of the Alliance. If in order to avoid an increase in tension between the old Cold War warriors Russia were included, then why not replace the Alliance with the Partnership for Peace? The residues of old Cold War tensions continue to lie heavily between the two, if anything but in the form of continued suspicion and caution. If peace is the ultimate goal of a new world order in a shrinking globe of affairs, dismantling a vestige created expressly under a military canopy seems to follow.
Benjamin Schwartz argued recently in a New York Times article, "Americas expansion of its imperial role in Europe cannot help but alarm Russia and thus create an enemy where none now exists."4 He argued that the United States position within the Alliance bears a great deal of the weight of military, financial, and geographic security, casting it in the role as head of an empire. In a political period where the U.S. is returning increasingly isolationist, the propagation of the idea of a larger and more complex NATO built under a complex set of uncertainties, thrusts the United States into a compromising position where it might find itself unable to fulfill military and financial obligations due entirely to ambiguity.
Opponents of NATO expansion question Americas security role when Washington seems to be returning to isolationism. Michael Mandelbaum, a foreign policy analyst at Johns Hopkins University,argues against eastward expansion of the Alliance, questioning the significance and responsibility, both moral and financial, of deterring conflict and crisis in neighboring countries such as Poland and Belarus, or Hungary and Romania. 5 And if Poland where admitted to the Alliance, would Poland possess the capability, militarily and financially, to defend American interests?
All Good Things . . .
NATO, a Cold War imperative, is now engaged in a futile attempt at expanding and preserving an alliance without a clear mission. Expanding defense protects against the possibility of a strong military force rising and threatening European democracy and security. Countries looking for admission such as Poland, Czech Republic, etc. lack a large military structure and probably would not add substantially to NATO military muscle. Enlarging the Alliance would spread the military thinly even with the added forces, and therefor not effectively defend and secure any threatened members.
NATO does not need to enlarge itself. Its purpose has been served. The reason behind its creation no longer exists. The discourse surrounding NATO expansion promotes the specter of a common enemy. Maybe if the discourse emphasized not a common enemy, but democracy as the common bound, would the transformation would occur in a gradual evolutionary manner. The continuance of NATO makes it into an organization that is in the business of creating threats to democracy in order to stay in existence.
| Notes 1. NATO Review #1 - January 1996 Vol. 44, p.6. 2. Washington Post. July 7, 1995. 3. United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO Department of Defense. Office of International Security Affairs. June 1995. 4. New York Times. May 10, 1995. 5. Washington Times. October 15, 1995. |
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Ms. Fonzo-Eberhard is a senior political science major at Southern Connecticut State University.