

**YALE UNIVERSITY**  
**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE**  
**POLITICAL ECONOMY READING LIST**

**May 2010**

In order to prepare for certification in the field of Political Economy, students should take PLSC 517 and at least two other courses from among the ten or so that are offered in the department. We highly recommend that students preparing for certification in this field take the exam, rather than the paper option. We have divided the reading list into eight categories. There will be some choice on the exam. The general philosophy is that the courses inform the reading list, which in turn informs the exam.

There is a difference between the Political Economy and Formal Theory fields. Both fields study literature in which modeling is an important technique. Political Economy students are expected to understand the models and their uses, but not to have a mastery in constructing and analyzing complex models. That further degree of mastery is, however, expected of formal theory students.

A list of political economy courses currently taught—although not all every year—from which the two elective courses can be chosen appears below. This list will change over the years.

PLSC 575 Political Competition (J. Roemer)

PLSC 736 Formal Models of Comparative Politics (T. Dunning)

PLSC 721 Political Economy of Institutions and Development (A. Debs)

PLSC 795 Models of Political Economy (J. Fox, S. Cho)

PLSC 693 International Political Economy (K. Scheve)

PLSC 725 Political Economy (E. Washington)

PLSC 595 Theories of Distributive Justice (J. Roemer)

PLSC 714 Corruption, Economic Development, and Democracy (S. Rose-Ackerman)

PLSC 802 Collective Action and Choice (J. Fox)

## 1. General

Palfrey, T. 2006. "Experiments in Political Economy," in *Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Persson, T. and G. Tabellini, 2000. *Political Economics*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

## 2. Distribution

Austen-Smith, D. 2000. "Redistributing income under proportional representation" *Journal of Political Economy* 108, 1235-69

Austen-Smith, D. and M. Wallerstein. 2006. "Redistribution and Affirmative Action." *Journal of Public Economics* 90: 1789-1823.

Banerjee, A. and L. Iyer. 2010. "Colonial Land Tenure, Electoral Competition, and Public Goods in India." In Jared Diamond and James A. Robinson, eds., *Natural Experiments of History*. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Boix, C. 2003. *Democracy and Redistribution*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cameron, D. 1979. "The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis." *American Political Science Review* 72(4):1243-1261.

Duflo, E., and R. Chattopadhyaya. 2004. "Women as Policy Makers: Evidence From a Randomized Policy Experiment in India." *Econometrica* 72 (5): 1409-1443.

Iversen, T., and D. Soskice. "An Asset Theory of Social Preferences." *American Political Science Review* 95(4):875-893.

Iversen, T., and F. Rosenbluth. "The Political Economy of Gender: Explaining Cross-National Variation in the Gender Division of Labor and the Gender Voting Gap." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(1):1-19.

Lee, W. and J. Roemer, 2006. "Racism and redistribution in the US: a solution to the problem of American exceptionalism," *J. Pub Econ* 90, 1027-1052

Luttmer, E. 2001. "Group loyalty and the taste for redistribution," *Journal of Political Economy* 109, 500-528

Moene, K. and M. Wallerstein, 2001. "Inequality, social insurance, and redistribution," *American Political Science Review* 95, 859-874

Piketty, T. & Emmanuel Saez, 2007. "How Progressive is the U.S. Federal Tax System? A Historical and International Perspective," *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 21(1), pages 3-24, Winter.

Piketty, Thomas, 1995. "Social Mobility and Redistributive Politics," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 110(3), 551-84

- Rodrik, Dani. 1998. "Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments." *Journal of Political Economy* 106 (5):997-1032.
- Roemer, J. 2009. "Prospects for achieving equality in market economies," in *Oxford Handbook of Economic Inequality*.
- Scheve, K. and D. Stasavage. 2006. "The Political Economy of Religion and Social Insurance in the United States, 1910-1939." *Studies in American Political Development* 20: 132-159.
- Scheve, K. and D. Stasavage. 2009. "Institutions, Partisanship, and Inequality in the Long Run." *World Politics* 61 (2): 215-53.
- Scheve, K. and D. Stasavage. *Forthcoming*. "The Conscription of Wealth: Mass Warfare and the Demand for Progressive Taxation." *International Organization*
- Swenson, P. 2002. *Capitalists Against Markets: The Making of Labor Markets and Welfare States in the United States and Sweden*. NY: Oxford University Press.
- Wallerstein, M. 1999. "Wage-Setting Institutions and Pay Inequality in Advanced Industrial Societies." *American Journal of Political Science*. 43 (3), 649-680

### **3. Development**

- Acemoglu, D. and J. Robinson. 2000. "Political Losers as Barriers to Economic Development." *American Economic Review* 90 (2000): 126-30.
- Acemoglu, D. and J. Robinson. 2008. "Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions." *American Economic Review* 98, no.1 (2008): 267-93.
- Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, and J. Robinson. 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation." *American Economic Review* 91 (2001): 1369-1401.
- Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, J.A. Robinson, and P. Yared. 2008. "Income and Democracy." *American Economic Review* 98(3):808-842.
- Bardhan, P. 1997. "Corruption and development: A review of issues," *J. Econ. Literature* 35, 1320-1346
- Dunning, T. 2008. *Crude democracy*, Cambridge University Press
- Ferraz, C. and F. Finan. 2008. "Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effect of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 123 (2): 703-745.
- McGuire, M. and M. Olson, 1996. "The economics of autocracy and majority rule: The invisible hand and the use of force," *J. Econ. Lit.* 34, 72-96
- Ostrom, E. 1990. *Governing the Commons*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Persson, T. and G. Tabellini, 1994. "Is inequality harmful for growth?" *American Economic Review* 84, 600-621
- Przeworski, A. M. Alvargen, J. Cheibub and F. Limongi, 2000. *Democracy and development: Political institutions and well-being in the world, 1950-90*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rose-Ackerman, S. 1999. *Corruption and government: Causes, Consequences and Reforms*.
- Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny, 1993. "Corruption." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*. 108, 599-617.

#### **4. Political Competition**

- Ansolabehere, S., J.M.D. Figueiredo and J. Snyder , 2002. "Why is there so little money in politics?" *J. Econ Persp.* 17, 105-130.
- Becker, G.S. 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 98 (3): 371-400.
- Besley, T. 2006. *Principled Agents? The political economy of good government*, Oxford University Press.
- Bueno de Mesquita, B., A. Smith, R.M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow. 2003. *The Logic of Political Survival*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- Coate, S. and S. Morris. 1995. "On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests." *Journal of Political Economy* 103 (6):1210-1235.
- De Figueiredo, R. 2002. "Electoral Competition, Political Uncertainty, and Policy Insulation." *American Political Science Review* 96 (2): 321-33.
- Grossman, G. and E. Helpman, 2002. *Special interest politics*, MIT Press
- Lizzeri, A. and N. Persico. 2004. "Why did the elites extend the suffrage?" *Quarterly Journal of Economics*. 119, 707-765
- Llavador, H. and R. Oxoby, 2005. "Partisan competition, growth, and the franchise," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*. 120, 1155-1189
- Olson, Mancur. 1971. *The Logic of Collective Action*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Osborne, M. and A. Slivinski, "A model of political competition with citizen candidates." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 111, 65-96.
- Peltzman, S. 1976. "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation." *Journal of Law and Economics* 19 (2).

- Prat, A. 2006. "Rational voters and political advertising," in *Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Roemer, J. 2006. "Modeling party competition in general elections," *Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Roemer, J. 2006. "Party competition under public and private financing," *Advances in theoretical economics* 6(1).
- Roemer, J. 2001. *Political Competition*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

## **5. International**

- Alt, J.E. and M. Gilligan. 1994. "The Political Economy of Trading States: Factor Specificity, Collective Action Problems, and Domestic Political Institutions." *Journal of Political Philosophy* 2(2): 643-673.
- Bagwell, K., and R.W. Staiger. 1999. "An Economic Theory of the GATT." *American Economic Review* 89(1): 190-214.
- Bulow, J., and K. Rogoff. 1989. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt." *Journal of Political Economy* 97(1): 155-178.
- Goldberg, P.K., and G. Maggi. 1999. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation." *American Economic Review* 89(5): 1135-1155.
- Grossman, G.M. and E. Helpman. 1994. "Protection for Sale." *American Economic Review* 84(4): 833-850.
- Maggi, G., and A. Rodriguez-Clare. 1998. "The Value of Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressures." *Journal of Political Economy* 106(3): 574-601.
- Mayer, W. 1984. "Endogenous Tariff Formation." *American Economic Review* 74 (5): 970-985.
- Powell, R. 2004. "The Inefficient Use of Power: Costly Conflict with Complete Information." *American Political Science Review* 98 (02): 231-241.
- Rogowski, R. 1987. "Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade." *The American Political Science Review* 81 (4):1121-1137.
- Rose, A. K. 2004. "Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade." *American Economic Review* 94(1): 98-114.
- Tomz, M, J. Goldstein, and D. Rivers. 2007. "Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade? Comment." *American Economic Review* 97(5): 2005-2018.
- Tomz, M. 2007. *Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

## **6. Distributive Justice**

Cohen, G.A. 1997. "Where the action is: On the site of distributive justice," *Phil. & Public Affairs* 26, 3-30

Dworkin, R. 1981. "What is equality? Part 2: Equality of resources," *Phil. & Public Affairs* 10, 283-345

Moreno-Ternero, J. and J. Roemer, 2008. "The veil of ignorance violates priority," *Economics & Philosophy* 24, 233-257

Roemer, J. 1998. *Equality of opportunity*, Harvard Univ. Press

Roemer, J. 2009. "Equality: Its justification, nature, and domain," in *Oxford Handbook of Economic inequality*, Oxford Univ Press.

## **7. Constitutions**

Mulligan, C.B., R. Gil, and X. Sala-i-Martin. 2004. "Do Democracies Have Different Public Policies than Nondemocracies?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 18(1): 51-74.

North, D.C. and B.R. Weingast. 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in 17<sup>th</sup> Century England." *Journal of Economic History* 49: 803-32.

Persson, T. and G. Tabellini. 2003. *The Economic Effects of Constitutions*. Cambridge: The MIT Press.

Stasavage, D. *Public Debt and the Birth of the Democratic State: France and Great Britain, 1688-1789*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

## **8. Macro**

Alesina, A., N. Roubini, and G. Cohen. 1997. *Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Hibbs, D. 2006. "Voting and the Macroeconomy," in *Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.