

**Yale University**  
Department of Political Science  
**International Relations Reading List**  
**2012**

**GENERAL THEORY**

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- Huntington, Samuel. 1993. "The Clash of Civilizations," *Foreign Affairs* 72(3).
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- Keohane, Robert and Judith Goldstein (1993). *Ideas and Foreign Policy*, Cornell University Press, chs. 1, 7.

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- Ruggie, John Gerard. 1998. *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization*. New York: Routledge. Chapters 1-5, 7.
- Ruggie, John Gerard. 1998. "What Makes the World Hang Together: Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge." *International Organization* 52 (4): 855-885.
- Schelling, Thomas. 1963. *The Strategy of Conflict*. 1-52, 83-161.
- Spruyt, Hendrik, 1994. *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors*. 22-57, 67-95.
- Thucydides. *The Peloponnesian War*. Book 1, paras 1-23, 66-88, 118-24, 140-46; Book 4, paras 37-51; Book V, Melian dialogue; Book 6, paras 84-116.
- Tilly, Charles. 1975. "Reflections on the History of European State-Making," in Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. Princeton U. Press. Pp. 3-50.
- Walt, Stephen 1999. "Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies," *International Security*, 23, 4, 5-48, and responses in 24, 2, 56-73, 97-106.

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Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*, chs. 4-8.

Wendt, Alexander. 1999. *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge University Press. Ch.1, 5-8.

### **IPE**

Alt, James E. and Michael Gilligan, "The Political Economy of Trading States: Factor Specificity, Collective Action Problems, and Domestic Political Institutions," *Journal of Political Philosophy* 2:2 (1994), 165-192.

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### **CONFLICT AND WAR**

- Allison, Graham, and Philip Zelikow. *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Longman, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., chs. 1,3,5
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- Gartzke, Erik. 2007. "The Capitalist Peace." *American Journal of Political Science* 51 (1): 166-191.
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- Holsti, Ole. 1989. "Crisis Decision Making." In Phillip Tetlock, et al.eds., *Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War*.
- Howell, William, and John Pevehouse. "Presidents, Congress, and the Use of Force." *International Organization*. Winter 2005.

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- Walzer, Michael. *Just and Unjust Wars*, chs. 8-9, 14-17.
- Weeks, Jessica. 2008. "Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve." *International Organization* 62: 35-64.
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## INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS

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