War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals
by David Halberstam

Reviewed by Matthew Louchheim

The United States achieved a paradox of power following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 – as the world’s only superpower it struggled to exert its influence from Somalia to the Balkans. Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist David Halberstam illustrates the foreign policy complexities of the Bush and Clinton administrations in his most recent book, War in a Time of Peace. His book successfully showcases the internal politics within and between the White House, the State Department, and the military. He deserves further praise for documenting domestic current events beginning with the 1992 election and concluding with the 1998 impeachment scandal; these events among others significantly impacted foreign policy decisions. His portrayals of players like Bush, Eagleburger, Hobrooke, and Powell also help us understand how their incentives, strengths, and weaknesses affected United States foreign relations between the Cold War and the War on Terror.

Despite the end of the Cold War, the United States was restrained militarily by the ghosts of the Vietnam War. The military consistently displayed restraint against the more hawkish White House by applying the Powell Doctrine: sufficient force to take on a clearly defined mission with clear rules of engagement and a clear policy for departure. This often led to schizophrenic policy that not only prevented or delayed action in Somalia, Rwanda, and the Balkans, but also restrained diplomacy because of the United States’ reluctance to use force.

Though written before the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Mr. Halberstam fails to report the relevant events that directly precede them. He excludes the Al-Qaida attacks on the American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the USS Cole in Yemen, and American helicopters in Somalia. Nor is there mention of the 1998 American air strikes against suspected terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and a weapons plant in Sudan. He also does not sufficiently describe Saddam Hussein’s removal of United Nations weapons inspectors and the subsequent American-led mission, Desert Fox, or explain why it ended after just several weeks of bombings. These omissions combined with Mr. Halberstam’s detailed analysis of the United States’ role in the Balkans, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti account for American vulnerability prior to September 11, 2001.

N.B.: I was surprised to read that the hawkish statements from the newly elected President Jacque Chirac of France encouraged former President Clinton to take action in the Balkans (to avoid losing face). And of course this NATO mission completely circumvented the United Nations Security Council in fear of the Russian veto.